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LEGAL PROFESSIONAL DE(RE)REGULATION,
EQUALITY, AND INCLUSION, AND THE
CONTESTED SPACE OF PROFESSIONALISM
WITHIN THE LEGAL MARKET
IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Lisa Webley*
INTRODUCTION
The legal profession in England and Wales is undergoing an
unprecedented process of de(re)regulation1 as a result of the Legal Services
Act 20072 (LSA 2007 or LSA). New types of legal businesses are
emerging, and law graduates—who previously had not found a place within
the regulated admitted legal profession—appear to be entering new facets of
the legal marketplace, albeit often in precarious circumstances via
circuitous routes.3 Moreover, globalization and the increased mobility of
legal professionals around Europe and industrialized and industrializing
common law countries are also reshaping sections of the legal market.4
* Professor of Empirical Legal Studies, University of Westminster. I am grateful for the
contributions of all who organized, hosted, and contributed to The Challenge of Equity and
Inclusion in the Legal Profession: An International and Comparative Perspective
Colloquium held at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the colloquium,
see Deborah L. Rhode, Foreword: Diversity in the Legal Profession: A Comparative
Perspective, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (2015).
1. I have used de(re)regulation to connote the confluence of a move to deregulate the
legal profession, namely to remove much of its apparatus and power of self-regulation, and
to reregulate the legal profession along market principles in accordance with New Labour’s
Third Way regulatory policy, discussed later in the Article.
2. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (Eng.).
3. On legal business innovation, see Lisa Webley, When Is a Family Lawyer a
Lawyer?, in DELIVERING FAMILY JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Mavis Maclean et al. eds.,
forthcoming May 2015). On entry into the legal sector, see generally HILARY SOMMERLAD,
LISA WEBLEY, LIZ DUFF, DANIEL MUZIO & JENNIFER TOMLINSON, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF BARRIERS AND INDIVIDUAL
CHOICES (2013), and Hilary Sommerlad, The New “Professionalism” in England and Wales:
Talent, Diversity, and a Legal Precariat, in DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE: RHETORIC AND REALITY
(Robert Nelson et al. eds., forthcoming 2015).
4. See John Flood, The Re-Landscaping of the Legal Profession: Large Law Firms and
Professional Re-Regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC’Y 507, 521 (2011). For example, the E.U.
freedom of movement treaty provisions and subsequent mutual recognition of legal
professional qualifications has played a role in this. It has led to the growth in the number of
Registered Foreign Lawyers practicing in England and Wales (for figures see Regulated
Population Statistics, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-wework/reports/data/population_solicitors.page), some of whom will requalify as solicitors in
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Although the new market model may be encouraging legal employers to
hire a broader cohort of law graduates, including those historically denied
access to a full career in law, it is also encouraging greater role and status
differentiation as between lawyers.5 The new model obfuscates the barriers
that face nonwhite and working class law graduates who wish to become
fully admitted members of the profession.6 Further, while equality and
inclusion discourse is well rehearsed regarding professional admission and
promotion,7 that terminology is less prominent in the access to justice
debate. Thus, it is unclear if market innovations are prompting greater
equality and inclusion for marginalized would-be clients or allowing the
state and the legal profession(s) to evade the fundamental rule of law
precept of access to justice for all.
This Article aims to examine equality and inclusion in legal services
from the perspectives of would-be lawyers and would-be clients. It begins
by examining the state and solicitors’ changing relationship regarding
access to justice, professional independence, and the rule of law. It then
considers the changes that the LSA 2007 wrought, and whether this
neoliberal turn can deliver equality and inclusion within the profession and
by the profession for those seeking redress with legal help. It also explores
whether de(re)regulation may be altering the legal profession(s)’s ability to
act as gatekeeper to the profession(s) and whether this too may have an
impact on equality and inclusion within the legal services sector and the
protection of consumers’ legal rights.8
I. THE SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION AND THE STATE:
EQUALITY AND INCLUSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP?
Civil legal aid is a useful case study through which to chart solicitors’
profession compact with the state.9 It also provides a vehicle through

England and Wales through the Qualified Lawyers Transfer Scheme (for details of the
scheme, see Qualified Lawyers Transfer Scheme, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH.,
http://www.sra.org.uk/qlts/).
5. See Webley, supra note 3.
6. See SOMMERLAD ET AL., supra note 3, at 25–30; Lisa Webley et al., Access to a
Career in the Legal Profession in England and Wales: Race, Class and the Role of
Educational Background, in DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE, supra note 3.
7. For gender-related equality and diversity literature, see generally Lisa Webley & Liz
Duff, Women Solicitors As a Barometer for Problems Within the Legal Profession—Time to
Put Values Before Profits?, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 374 (2007). For literature on minorities and the
profession, see generally Hilary Sommerlad, Minorities, Merit, and Misrecognition in the
Globalized Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2481 (2012).
8. A note on the difficulty of terminology regarding the legal profession(s) in England
and Wales: because the profession is split (the main branches being solicitors, barristers, and
chartered legal executives), it is difficult to talk of the legal profession as a monolith.
Further, each branch is increasingly heterogeneous, and thus at times I refer to individual
branches of the profession(s) and sectors within them, although the switches in approach are
not ideal.
9. For a detailed and forensic insight into legal aid development in England, Wales, and
Scotland, see generally ALAN PATERSON, HAMLYN LECTURES 2010: LAWYERS AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD 59–124 (2012).
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which to view the waning influence of political and economic liberalism,10
as successive governments introduced neoliberal reforms to embed market
economics and consumer choice within the discourse of access to justice
and legal service provision.11
A. The Scheme at Its Inception: Liberal Collectivism: The Middle Way
The civil legal aid system in England and Wales emerged from the
postwar Butskellite consensus as a form of Middle Way collective welfare
provision offered via a state-market partnership to serve the practical needs
of a liberal market.12 It was introduced by the Attlee Labour government in
the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949.13 A liberal collectivist state-market
partnership was an ideal mechanism to adopt given that it developed from
the previous pro bono charitable model already operated by the Law
Society.14 The structures of the charitable relief model were simply
amended to permit an expanded, yet state-subsidized, solution to legal
need.15 The system was administered by the then-solicitors’ professional
body on behalf of the state (the Law Society of England and Wales), and
the day-to-day services were provided by private practice lawyers operating
within a state-defined scheme. Payment for the work was made from
general taxation. This scheme provided a mechanism by which people of
moderate and limited means could enforce and defend their legal rights and
responsibilities. Given the relatively limited litigation culture at that time,
the civil legal aid system facilitated a redistribution of legal costs across

10. Liberalism is a contested term and there is insufficient space in this Article to
examine competing conceptions here. For the purposes of this discussion, liberalism is
considered to be an ideology that seeks to maximize citizens’ freedom through the exercise
of individual rights, within a moderate state adhering to a democratic tradition. It regulates
business and the market so as to limit concentrations of power; it provides a welfare state so
as to reduce inequality through some measure of redistribution of power and/or capital. For
a fuller discussion, see Simon Clarke, The Neoliberal Theory of Society, in NEOLIBERALISM:
A CRITICAL READER (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston eds., 2005).
11. For a discussion of the politics of lawyering, see generally LAWYERS AND THE RISE
OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH
TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES (Terrence Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997); Terrence
Halliday, The Politics of Lawyers: An Emerging Agenda, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1007
(1999); Stuart A. Scheingold, Taking Weber Seriously: Lawyers, Politics and the Liberal
State, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1061 (1999).
12. PETE ALCOCK, SOCIAL POLICY IN BRITAIN 186–88 (3d ed. 2008).
13. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 (Eng.).
14. See Richard I. Morgan, The Introduction of Civil Legal Aid in England and Wales,
1914–1949, 5 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 38, 41–44 (1994); Maureen Spencer, Public
Subsidies Without Strings—Labour and the Lawyers at the Birth of Legal Aid, 9 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 251 (2002). For a discussion of the pro bono publico tradition in the legal
profession, see generally Andrew Boon & Avis Whyte, “Charity and Beating Begins at
Home”: The Aetiology of the New Culture of Pro Bono Publico, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 169
(1999), and Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004).
15. Legal aid costs could be recovered from the non-legally aided losing opponent.
Further costs could be recovered (to an extent) from a legally aided winning party (through
the statutory charge) and thus the scheme, while not cost neutral, allowed for recovery of
costs to the taxpayer in some situations. For information on the operation of the statutory
charge, see LEGAL AID AGENCY, THE STATUTORY CHARGE MANUAL 2–10 (2014).
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taxpayers, rather than a redistribution of wealth between them. In doing so,
most citizens had the ability to obtain legal advice and the opportunity to
access justice.16 There was congruence between the scheme’s aims: a
means by which the state could offer some measure of social protection to
citizens through recourse to law while supporting the market as an engine
of prosperity, and Keynesianism, the prevailing economic theory.17
The Rushcliffe Committee, which took evidence on the merits of
establishing a national legal aid system, determined that a private practice
model was essential given that the rule of law demanded that a claimant’s
legal dispute against the state be administered and conducted by an
independent, rather than state employed, lawyer.18 During the period
between its inception and the Conservative government’s return to power in
1979, the scope and reach of the civil legal aid system broadened to reflect
the original intentions of the Rushcliffe Committee, rather than the 1949
compromise brokered among the Treasury, the Lord Chancellor’s
Department, and the Law Society.19 As expectations about access to justice
developed, the power and the role of solicitors increased and, consequently,
so did the English Bar. The legal profession had instantiated its
professional status through these negotiations by underlining its lynchpin
role in ensuring the rule of law, particularly important at a time when the
consequences of a breakdown of the rule of law were all too evident in
nearby countries.
B. Neoliberal Reforms: The New Market Model
At the height of the scheme an estimated 80 percent of the population
was eligible for civil legal advice and assistance (including court
representation) for a wide range of matters. By the early 1990s, however,
16. See Susanne MacGregor, Welfare, Neo-Liberalism and New Paternalism: Three
Ways for Social Policy in Late Capitalist Societies, 67 CAP. & CLASS 91, 100 (1999);
Richard Moorhead, Legal Aid in the Eye of a Storm: Rationing, Contracting and a New
Institutionalism, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y 365, 367 (1998); Spencer, supra note 14, at 270. “An
outstanding characteristic of expenditure on legal matters is that people may, through no
fault of their own, be involved in litigation, the costs of which bear no relation to their
financial circumstances and against which they could not reasonably be expected to make
provision in advance.” Spencer, supra note 14, at 264 (citing PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, AST
20/40 DRAFT MEMORANDUM ON LEGAL AID (Mar. 1945)).
17. This scheme could, following Talcott Parsons, be viewed as a functional mechanism
to effect legitimation of the normative order through the conduit of a private practice actor
who would both (1) represent the client and manage his expectations of the state, and
(2) give an aura of authority and neutrality to the law (as well as legitimacy to the client’s
concerns). See TALCOTT PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34–49 (1954);
TALCOTT PARSONS, SOCIETIES: EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 10–11
(Alex Inkeles ed., 1966). Alan Paterson considers professionalism to be a neocontractual
relationship by which the lawyer fulfills important social functions according to a contract
with society. See PATERSON, supra note 9, at 16.
18. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL ADVICE IN ENGLAND AND
WALES, CMD. NO. 6641, at 23 (1945); see also Morgan, supra note 14, at 68; Spencer, supra
note 14, at 259.
19. See Morgan, supra note 14, at 38; Spencer, supra note 14, at 255; see also DEP’T
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL AID 8 (2005).
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eligibility had dropped below 40 percent and the scope of the scheme had
begun to shrink.20 The civil legal aid scheme appeared, superficially, to
have conformed to Hayek’s contention that the state should allow a market
to function with limited distortion caused through state interference: legal
aid clients could choose their lawyer freely and the lawyer would conduct
the case as she or he would do for a privately paying client.21 But the case
was taxpayer funded, and the burgeoning legal aid bill was incompatible
with the Thatcherite government’s aim of public spending retrenchment to
counteract the economic difficulties of the early 1980s.22 The discourse
had shifted from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, and policies aimed at
achieving this were pursued relentlessly.23
Neoliberalism is an umbrella ideology that brings together the
intellectual, bureaucratic, and political realms.24 Its Anglo-American, postwelfare, capitalist, right-leaning roots have dominated the intellectual
realm, where the market is deemed to be a neutral force for individual
freedom and prosperity. But, interestingly, most of the sites of recent
struggle have been within left-leaning European countries with social
democratic, welfarist, Keynesian traditions; the market has become so
embedded in political and public postwar consciousness that the organizing
principle of the market has found a home across the mainstream political
spectrum.25 The bureaucratic regulatory responses may differ in left- and
right-leaning environments, but the hallmarks of neoliberalism have been
evident in both:
liberalization (including the “desacralization” of
institutions that have historically been protected from market competition,
such as the legal profession), deregulation, privatization, depoliticization,
and monetarism.26 In its ideological heartland, the political realm, marketcentric politics have prevailed as the market has been reified to a common
sense totalizing force for good.27 This has had a profound impact on legal
professional autonomy, notions of inclusion within the legal market and by
the legal market, and the nature of the duty to provide access to justice as a
social and political good.
The neoliberal model seeks to (1) address social issues with reference to
market principles, (2) limit a “dependency culture,” and (3) incentivize
creative private solutions that encourage consumer choice and power.28
From the mid-1980s the government acted in keeping with Charles

20. See STEVE HYNES & JON ROBINS, LEGAL ACTION GRP., THE JUSTICE GAP: WHATEVER
HAPPENED TO LEGAL AID? 21 (2009).
21. See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 41 (1994) (1944).
22. See Philip A. Thomas, Thatcher’s Will, 19 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 9 (1992).
23. See id.; see also Hilary Sommerlad, Managerialism and the Legal Profession: A
New Professional Paradigm, 2 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 159, 165 (1995).
24. See Stephanie Lee Mudge, The State of the Art: What is Neo-Liberalism, 6 SOCIOECON. REV. 703, 704–05 (2008).
25. Id. at 704.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 705.
28. See ALCOCK, supra note 12, at 183–86.
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Murray’s neoliberal thesis,29 to remove what it considered to be perverse
incentives of lawyer-induced demand.30 There was a perception of a
developing litigation culture where the state paid for much of the bill and
the client took little of the risk.31 Businesses and the state were considered
to be the victims of vexatious claims brought by underserving claimants
represented by self-interested lawyers operating within a legal services
market that was bloated and dysfunctional (classic neoliberal claims).32
These were all clear market distortions that led to market failure and, in
turn, resulted in a reduction in social well-being and greater unemployment,
neoliberalists contended.33 Thus, means testing was reformed to cut
eligibility for the civil legal scheme. Subsequently, there were cuts in legal
aid payment rates and, for the first time, a hard cap on legal aid
expenditure.34 The administration of the scheme was transferred from the
profession to a new statutory body, the Legal Aid Board, to be run on new
public management principles.35 It could be argued, on the one hand, that
the continued power of the legal profession resulted in an incremental
“salami slicing” of the civil legal aid scheme, rather than a one-off radical
reform.36 On the other hand, the grip of market individualism led different
factions within the profession(s) to fight to keep their own areas within
scope while allowing others to be sacrificed.37 The price of keeping the
scheme, albeit in a blanched-out form, was the introduction of
accountability measures through a regulatory system that foreshadowed the
introduction of independent regulation of the legal profession later to be

29. See generally CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
1950–1980 (1984). See also ALAN DEACON, PERSPECTIVES ON WELFARE: IDEAS, IDEOLOGIES
AND POLICY DEBATES 32–42 (2002).
30. See Moorhead, supra note 16, at 376; Roger Smith, Legal Aid on an Ebbing Tide, 23
J.L. & SOC’Y 570, 574 (1996).
31. In most forms of dispute in the United Kingdom, the loser pays the winner’s legal
costs unless otherwise agreed. Historically, this was not the case if the loser was a legal aid
client (costs protection has since been reformed). It was argued that this model incentivized
the privately paying client to settle before court so as not to incur additional court costs
regardless of whether they won or not. For figures associated with this contention, see
Smith, supra note 30, at 571–72.
32. See MacGregor, supra note 16, at 103–07.
33. See Thomas I. Palley, From Keynsianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting Paradigms in
Economics, in NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 10, at 20–29.
34. See Tamara Goriely, Rushcliffe Fifty Year On: The Changing Role of Civil Legal
Aid Within the Welfare State, 21 J.L. & SOC’Y 545, 556 (1994); Smith, supra note 30, at
571–72; Spencer, supra note 14, at 266; Thomas, supra note 22, at 9.
35. For a detailed discussion of these changes in the civil legal aid system, see generally
Moorhead, supra note 16; Sommerlad, supra note 23; Hilary Sommerlad, The
Implementation of Quality Initiatives and the New Public Management in the Legal Aid
Sector in England and Wales: Bureaucratisation, Stratification and Surveillance, 6 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 311 (1999).
36. For a discussion of constituencies of power within a welfare state context, see
Macgregor, supra note 16, at 105. For a discussion of the legal profession as a constituency,
see Thomas, supra note 22, at 5.
37. See Spencer, supra note 14, at 260–61. Paterson contends that legal professionals
stifled the public’s voice and thus defined what was in the public interest. See PATERSON,
supra note 9, at 62.
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introduced by the LSA 2007.38 Over time the scheme also opened up the
legal aid market to those outside traditional legal practice, operating in notfor-profit advice agencies.39 This was proof that nonlawyer organizations
could deliver services effectively, and to a quality standard. High street
lawyers were unable to repel the state’s incursion into their territory, and
the elite corporate branch of the profession did not come to their aid.
Collective action had drained away with the last vestiges of Keynesianism,
to be replaced by a neoliberal competition; as Margaret Thornton indicates,
The legal
“competition is necessarily corrosive of community.”40
profession as an institution was gradually being desacralized and individual
lawyers, like much of society, quietly depoliticized.
To complement civil legal aid the government introduced a market
solution to access justice: a fee regime known as “conditional fee
arrangements” which was a forerunner of the “no win no fee” agreements
often employed today.41 These arrangements were intended to shift
financial risk from the state to the profession for all but the poorest in
society. Over time fee regimes were relaxed even further.42 A residual
welfare state model, at the service of the market, was closer to being
realized, with fewer clients eligible for legal aid assistance, and the market
freed to provide creative fee solutions to non-legally aided “consumers.”43
The commitment of lawyers to undertake legal aid began to wane, and as
the economy was reshaped and Adam Smith’s market expansion
mechanism44 developed to afford a greater division of labor resulting in
specialization in service, the profession became more fragmented and

38. For a discussion of regulation and new public management in a legal aid context, see
HILARY SOMMERLAD & PETER SANDERSON, TRAINING AND REGULATING THOSE PROVIDING
PUBLICLY FUNDED LEGAL ADVICE SERVICES: A CASE STUDY OF CIVIL PROVISION 37–76
(2008); Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in
England and Wales, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 794–800 (2003); Richard Moorhead, Third
Way Regulation? Community Legal Service Partnerships, 64 MOD. L. REV. 543, 544–56
(2001).
39. See Moorhead et al., supra note 38, at 772–75.
40. See Margaret Thornton, Neoliberal Melancholia: The Case of Feminist Legal
Scholarship, 20 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 7, 7 (2004).
41. See generally Maureen Spencer, The Common Law Legacy and Access to Justice:
Contingency Fees and the Birth of Civil Legal Aid, 9 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 32 (2000). Solicitors
were permitted to waive their legal fees in instances where their client did not win, although
the client remained liable for the opponent’s legal costs. However, the solicitors had to
charge the full fee plus a premium in a successful case, a strictly controlled predetermined
percentage of the fees. See Hilary Sommerlad, Some Reflections on the Relationship Between
Citizenship, Access to Justice, and the Reform of Legal Aid, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 345, 345–46
(2004) (explaining the shift from a duty to provide access to justice to a market risk–
opportunity calculation); see also RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., SCOPING PROJECT ON NO WIN
NO FEE AGREEMENTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 23 (2009); Stella Yarrow & Pamela Abrams,
Conditional Fees: The Challenge to Ethics, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 192, 193–97 (1999).
42. For up-to-date information on fee regimes in England and Wales, see Main Changes,
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil-justice-reforms/mainchanges.
43. See ALCOCK, supra note 12, at 185.
44. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
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segmented.45 The profession that had used the importance of access to
justice as the key reason for its independence from the state did not or could
not make up the shortfall in supply to meet consumer need with non-state
subsidized services. A whole swathe of clients were returned to a prewar
position of limited access to legal redress. The Conservative government’s
approaches had not only changed the civil legal aid system, but
neoliberalism also encouraged much of the profession to adopt a more
obviously business-led model of service provision. The monolithic
conception of old-style professionalism was challenged, as was its potential
for collective action.46
Even the terminology used by government and by sections of the legal
profession gradually changed to reflect this switch: the “practice of law”
became the “provision of legal services,” and “legal professionals” became
“legal service providers.”47 While some sections of the profession fiercely
resisted these changes, most notably much of the English Bar and some
solicitors who remained ideologically committed to legal aid as a social
justice project, others embraced them wholeheartedly.48 Much of the
access to justice discussion had shifted from universalism to individualism,
mediated by market principles.49 So had professional practice.
II. THE LEGAL SERVICE ACT 2007: EQUALITY AND INCLUSION
FOR LEGAL CONSUMERS THROUGH THE MARKET?
The LSA 2007 was enacted by a New Labour center-left government
espousing the Third Way ideology at the height of the economic boom.
The Third Way ideology requires the government to take an active role in
investing in human and other resources so as to develop entrepreneurialism
to create wealth, which can then be used to develop economic security and
allow for redistribution.50 The Third Way ideology differs from classical
social democracy in that it considers wealth creation to be fundamental to
economic security and redistribution, but although the Third Way seeks to
humanize the market, it accepts the theoretical tenets of neoliberalism

45. See Sommerlad, supra note 23, at 165; Thomas, supra note 22, at 7. For a
discussion of the ideological foundations of neoliberalism, see Clarke, supra note 10, at 50–
59. For a discussion of the importance of specialization to the quality of legal work
undertaken, see generally Moorhead et al., supra note 38.
46. See MacGregor, supra note 16, at 102–07; Thomas, supra note 22, at 2–3 (arguing
that professional deregulation and developments in favor of an enterprise culture were not
wholly government led, as some of these policies reflected what was already happening in
some sectors of the legal profession).
47. See Thomas, supra note 22, at 5.
48. The Chairman of the Bar Council stated: “[J]ustice cannot be measured in terms of
competition and consumerism; justice is not a consumer durable; it is the hallmark of a
civilised and democratic society.” Thomas, supra note 22, at 5 (citation omitted).
49. See MacGregor, supra note 16, at 110; see also Hilary Sommerlad, Reflections on
the Reconfiguration of Access to Justice, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 179, 181–83 (2008).
50. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 99
(1998).
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regarding income distribution and the stability of capital economies.51 It
differs in its bureaucratic response by placing emphasis on regulatory
mechanisms to incentivize businesses and the professions to serve
consumer interests, rather than leaving it to the market to determine whether
to serve those interests.52
Consequently, a new regulatory environment was introduced to break up
professional monopolies and invigorate the legal market, while reducing the
asymmetries of power between the consumer and service provider. This
was a step on the way to Milton Friedman’s “elementary . . . proposition
that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the
transaction is bi-laterally voluntary and informed.”53 The LSA 2007
uncoupled the machinery of admission, professional complaint, and
discipline from the original professional bodies. The Law Society of
England and Wales, the General Council of the Bar, and the Chartered
Institute of Legal Executives continue to act as professional associations for
their members, have a campaigning role, and provide membership services.
But the admission and disciplinary arms have been reallocated to
independent (frontline) regulators with majority lay representation.54
Consumer complaints are now made to the independent Legal Ombudsman
(LeO), which has exclusive first instance jurisdiction over complaints’
redress in respect of admitted legal professionals, although discipline rests
with the frontline regulators.55 The LSA 2007 also established an
independent oversight regulator, the Legal Services Board (LSB), with
statutory powers and duties to ensure that the regulatory objectives of the
LSA are realized either through the frontline regulators or through direct
intervention if necessary.56 A consumer panel has been established to
advise the LSB on the consumer standpoint and barriers to accessing quality
legal services at the right price in the right way.57 Professional autonomy
has been removed in favor of an independent risk-based, outcome-focused
approach to regulation and quality assurance, similar to regulatory policy in

51. For a discussion of New Labour and the Third Way from an economic perspective,
see generally Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, The Economics of the Third Way, 6 NEW
POL. ECON. 255 (2001); Palley, supra note 33, at 20–29.
52. For a brief discussion of the differences between the Third Way ideology and classic
social democracy, see Palley, supra note 33, at 20–29.
53. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1982).
54. These are the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), the Bar Standards Board
(BSB), and for chartered legal executives the Ilex Professional Standards (IPS).
55. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 112–161, schs. 16–19 (Eng.).
56. The regulatory objectives are:
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest; (b) supporting the constitutional
principle of the rule of law; (c) improving access to justice; (d) protecting and
promoting the interests of consumers; (e) promoting competition in the provision
of services . . . ; (f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal
profession; (g) increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and
duties; (h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles.
Id. § 1(1).
57. Id. § 8.
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the financial services and related sectors.58 The regulatory intervention of
the LSB serves as an agent of the Third Way to further entrepreneurialism
in the legal services market while regulating so as to provide a measure of
consumer protection.
The reforms pose a real challenge to duty and service-based conceptions
of professionalism, although fit more easily with Paterson’s
neocontractualism.59 Essential features of the professions include selfregulatory status, training and admission, complaints handling, disciplinary
functions, an exclusive jurisdiction over particular types of work, and, in
some definitions, responsibility to public service or duty.60 Gatekeeping
controls provide a means to socialize nascent professionals and police the
technical basis of the professional community.61 Regulation and ethical
precepts provide a mechanism through which ongoing supervision may be
undertaken, wrongdoing may be punished (to a greater or lesser extent), and
status may be maintained or improved.62 The gatekeeping, accreditation,
and regulation roles reassure the public, may be used to repel the state’s
power, and are considered fundamental given that the profession’s claim to
legitimacy rests on its role in the maintenance of the rule of law. Critics of
traditional models of professionalism, such as Richard Abel, argue that the
legal profession sets entry requirements to create a barrier to limit the
58. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, REPORT ON COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS: A REPORT
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING 2–10 (2001). For a worked example of how
economic theory and competition law may lead to an incursion in a rule of professional
practice, see JOHN FLOOD & MORTEN HVIID, THE CAB RANK RULE: ITS MEANING AND
PURPOSE IN THE NEW LEGAL SERVICES MARKET: REPORT FOR THE LEGAL SERVICES BOARD
14–22 (2013).
59. See generally Alan A. Paterson, Professionalism and the Legal Services Market, 3
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 137 (1996). For a discussion of professionalism and requirements
linked to the ability to maintain professional autonomy, see generally Richard L. Abel, The
Rise of Professionalism, 6 BRITISH J.L. & SOC’Y 82 (1979). See also ANDREW ABBOTT, THE
SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); MAGALI S.
LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
60. For an in-depth discussion of the essential features of the professions, see generally
THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS?: THE RESTRUCTURING OF PROFESSIONAL WORK (Jane
Broadbent et al. eds., 1997) (charting the development of the professions and features
considered to be essential by most, but not all, professions). See also Gerald Hanlon &
Joanna Shapland, Professional Disintegration?, in THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS?, supra, at
103–122; PATERSON, supra note 9, at 5–58; Robert Dingwall & Paul Fenn, “A Respectable
Profession”? Sociological and Economic Perspectives on the Regulation of Professional
Services, 7 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 51, 52 (1987); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professessions Are
Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 713, 729–30 (1999); Paterson, supra note 59, at 137; Harold L. Wilensky, The
Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. SOC. 137, 138 (1964).
61. See LARSON, supra note 59, at 204; Abel, supra note 59, at 82; Penny Cavenagh,
Chris Dewberry & Paul Jones, Becoming Professional: When and How Does It Start? A
Comparative Study of First-Year Medical and Law Students in the UK, 34 MED. EDUC. 897
(2000).
62. See Andrew Boon, From Public Service to Service Industry:
The Impact of
Socialisation and Work on the Motivation and Values of Lawyers, 12 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF.
229 (2005); Lisa Webley, Gate-Keeper, Supervisor or Mentor? The Role of Professional
Bodies in the Regulation And Professional Development of Solicitors and Family Mediators
Undertaking Divorce Matters in England and Wales, 32 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 119
(2010).
BY THE
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number of lawyers who reach full professional status so as to restrict supply
of legal services and drive up prices.63 The justification that professional
self-regulation ensures quality and competence is backed up by little
It is specialization, rather than professional
empirical evidence.64
affiliation, that appears to be the key to quality.65 Professional autonomy in
policing its membership also allowed old hierarchies to persist, and the
naturally conservative solicitors’ and barristers’ professions reproduced
themselves very effectively and were relatively ineffective at addressing
consumer complaints.66 In addition, some factions of the profession had
linked their future to a pure business model, yet had retained a conservative
model of power and privilege. Regulatory intervention in the legal sector
was the natural culmination of the intellectual and bureaucratic elements of
neoliberal market ideology, a function of the profession’s perceived failure
to create a market that functions to meet the public need for legal help when
state funding was withdrawn.
The LSA 2007 reforms need to be seen in the context of England’s
historically narrow unauthorized practice of law rules, which were not
amended by the LSA. Contrary to many other jurisdictions, most legal
activities are not reserved to admitted legal professionals; there are only six
reserved activities that must be undertaken by qualified and admitted
(authorized) lawyers.67 No single branch of the legal profession is
authorized to conduct all six activities, although it is possible for
individuals within each branch to undertake further accreditation to gain
additional authorization to undertake more areas of reserved work.68 These
provisions are not new, they were extant even before the introduction of the

63. See RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (2003); Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously,
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41, 43–44. But see PATERSON, supra note 9, at 53 (asserting that the
lawyer professionalism is embedded within neocontractualism, which allows for change over
time).
64. And indeed there is some evidence to the contrary. See RICHARD MOORHEAD,
AVROM SHERR, LISA WEBLEY, SARAH ROGERS, LORRAINE SHERR, ALAN PATERSON & SIMON
DOMBERGER, QUALITY AND COST: FINAL REPORT ON THE CONTRACTING OF CIVIL, NONFAMILY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE PILOT (2001); Moorhead et al., supra note 38, at 795.
65. See Moorhead et al., supra note 38, at 795, 799–800.
66. See RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., WILLING BLINDNESS?: OSS COMPLAINTS
HANDLING PROCEDURES 37 (2000); Lisa Webley et al., Access to a Career in the Legal
Profession in England and Wales: Race, Class and the Role of Educational Background, in
DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE, supra note 3.
67. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 12 (Eng.). The reserved activities are set out in
the LSA 2007 schedules 2 and 12 but predate the Act: (1) the exercise of rights of audience
(i.e., appearing as an advocate before a court); (2) the conduct of litigation (i.e., issuing
proceedings before a court and commencing, prosecuting, or defending those proceedings);
(3) reserved instrument activities (i.e., dealing with the transfer of land or property under
specific legal provisions including registration of land); (4) probate activities (i.e., handling
probate/estate matters for clients); (5) notarial activities (i.e., work governed by the Public
Notaries Act 1801); and (6) the administration of oaths (e.g., swearing affidavits, taking
oaths). Id. For a counterpoint in the U.S. context, see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Policing
the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
68. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 12–21, sch. 2 (Eng.).
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civil legal aid scheme, but the dynamic changes to legal professional
regulation and law firm ownership have brought them to the attention of a
much wider audience, and the new regulatory context is now more
attractive to legal neophytes.69 The LSA 2007 has opened up the legal
services sector to those who wish to invest in legal businesses; alternative
business structures allow for the licensing of nonlawyer-owned businesses
to provide authorized (reserved) legal services by authorized legal
professionals, which was impermissible until the introduction of the LSA.
But given that the legal profession(s)’s abilities to take collective action
have been undermined, and that the reserved activity rules increasingly pit
one legal professional branch against another, one legal professional against
another, division of labor and market competition are assured in an
environment in which admitted legal professionals and those with no legal
accreditation compete vigorously for consumers.
The dazzling array of options open to consumers, the huge knowledge
asymmetry in a messy professional arena, and the lack of consistent
regulation make this a difficult environment to navigate successfully for
consumers.70 The risk of legal costs and the potential rewards of legal
action are now borne by individual consumers and shared, in some
instances, with lawyers, rather than by the taxpayer through the legal aid
scheme. It is a little early to be able to track trends in access to justice, but
early indications suggest that increasing numbers of clients are selfrepresenting and may not be able to seek expert evidence to support their
cases.71 Alternative providers and greater publicity of non-reserved
services may increase options for consumers at a price they can afford.72
But non-reserved services undertaken by service providers who are not
formally admitted to one of the branches of the profession remain beyond
the jurisdiction of the LeO, giving rise to consumer protection concerns as
well as a distorted market. The solicitors profession’s standing in the
debate would be much improved by switching admission to the Roll of
solicitors (albeit with a requirement of a period of work-based training
under supervision) to before the training contract phase so as to permit
regulation of this cadre of lawyers who are seeking employment in the new
69. See Webley, supra note 3.
70. For further discussion on the legal service markets, see Richard Moorhead, Why
There Might Be a Market for Lemons: Some Thoughts on Competition, Quality and
Regulation in Legal Service Markets, in UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR
LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION—A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 24 (Legal Services Board ed.,
2011). Richard Moorhead argues that competition on quality is critically dependent on the
consumer’s knowledge of quality so that he or she may act on that knowledge to make
rational decisions. Id. He also indicates that clients have relatively limited knowledge about
differences in lawyer quality, making assumptions that they are relatively similar in their
abilities. Id.
71. See RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON, DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
LITIGANTS IN PERSON: UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS 251–52
(2005); LIZ TRINDER ET AL., MINISTRY JUSTICE, LITIGANTS IN PERSON IN PRIVATE FAMILY
LAW CASES 73–74 (2014); KIM WILLIAMS, MINISTRY JUST., LITIGANTS IN PERSON: A
LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2011).
72. See Webley, supra note 3.
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market without professional affiliation or regulation.73 This would bring far
more legal service providers within the scope of the regulated profession
and enormously increase the diversity of the professional bodies, creating a
stronger voice in the legal service market. It would also dilute the
profession’s gatekeeping role and, therefore, some may be anxious about
reduction in exclusivity claims and, thus, of status. As things stand, it is
extremely difficult for consumers to know who is an admitted lawyer.
Distinctions between different professional groupings are difficult to
pinpoint, as are the consequences of those affiliations. But rather than
working together to send a unified message to the public about admission,
regulation, and consumer protection, each professional branch is attempting
to capitalize on market deregulation so as to gain a share of each other’s
traditional markets.
Further, by bearing down on eligibility for legal aid and taking most
people out of the scope of the civil scheme, successive governments have
managed with clever sleight of hand to remove legal aid funding from the
forefront of public consciousness. The public does not see the nexus
between access to civil justice and the rule of law and has largely accepted
state rhetoric that lawyers are in league with business rather than champions
for the ordinary citizen.74 The LSA 2007 reforms may deliver a plurality of
services at a range of costs, but it is not yet clear that they can deliver
inclusion and equality for legal consumers. Nor is it likely that professional
bodies will be able to provide much help to legal consumers in this regard.
The depoliticization ushered in by neoliberalism and its academic
equivalent postmodernism, both of which turn attention away from macro
claims to focus attention on the micro, and the individual, has neutered
political social justice movements and depoliticized much of the
professional elite, including the legal profession75 and its client base.76 If
the market cannot provide access to justice, the profession is unlikely at
present to be able to mobilize its members and the public to affect political
change.

73. The new Bar Code regulates all barristers (fully qualified or otherwise) for reserved
and unreserved matters post call/admission to the Bar but pre-pupillage. See BAR
STANDARDS BD., THE BAR STANDARDS BOARD HANDBOOK R. 17.1, 17.8 (2014). They are not
fully admitted to practice but they are members of a professional association and are
regulated by the frontline regulator the BSB. For details, see Marc Mason, UK: Room at the
Inns—The Increased Scope of Regulation Under the New Bar Standards Board Handbook
for England and Wales, 17 LEGAL ETHICS 143 (2014).
74. See, e.g., Sadiq Khan, Cutting Legal Aid Is an Easy Gimmick—This Is Part of a
Pattern, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
feb/27/cutting-legal-aid-reform-chris-grayling-justice-system.
75. The criminal Bar, however, has recently held an unprecedented strike to protest
against cuts to criminal legal aid. See Jonathan Ames, Crime Barristers Strike Over Legal
Aid Cuts As Solicitors Call for Leaders to Resign, LAWYER, Mar. 7, 2014, available at
http://www.thelawyer.com/news/crime-barristers-strike-over-legal-aid-cuts-as-solicitorscall-for-leaders-to-resign/3017273.article.
76. For a discussion of neoliberalism, the depoliticization, and the postmodern turn, see
Thornton, supra note 40, at 9.
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III. THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS:
CAN THE FREE MARKET DELIVER GREATER EQUALITY
AND INCLUSION FOR ASPIRANT LEGAL PROFESSIONALS?
The profile of law graduates in England and Wales has markedly
diversified over the past thirty years.77 From the mid-1980s, the solicitors
profession (and to a lesser extent the Bar) needed to increase in size to serve
the expanding business market. This expansion coincided with the statesupported expansion of higher education places to meet broader market
needs: the proportion of U.K. seventeen- to thirty-year-olds who attended
university fluctuated between 10 and 15 percent during late 1960s to 1980s,
then rose steadily to approximately 40 percent in 2000, and has now
reached approximately 49 percent of that age group.78 Undergraduate
tuition fees were, primarily, met by the state rather than by the students
themselves until the introduction of undergraduate student fees in 1998.79
Further, access to the legal profession was extended, albeit tentatively and
briefly from the late 1980s to the early 2000s; registered traineeships
increased by 62.4 percent between 1989 and 1990 and 1999 and 2000—
from 3524 to 5285.80 Given that the traditional pool of elites was
insufficient to meet market needs, the population of black, Asian, minority
ethnic (BAME)81 and female entrants to the legal profession increased.82
Today, law school graduating cohorts continue to diversify.83 The
proportion of law graduates who self-define as BAME is about 32 percent
77. See LAW SOC’Y, TRENDS IN THE SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION 2013, at 32–36 (2014).
78. For a discussion of this trend, see Haroon Chowdry et al., Widening Participation in
Higher Education: Analysis Using Linked Administrative Data, 176 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y
431 (2013), and IAN WALKER & YU ZHU, DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE
IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY DEGREES ON THE LIFE CYCLE OF EARNINGS: SOME FURTHER
ANALYSIS 36–49 (2013).
79. See SECURING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION: AN INDEPENDENT
REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING & STUDENT FINANCE 18–19 (2010). The fees
regimes was as follows: £1,000 per year in 1998; £3,000 per year in 2004; £3,290 per year
in 2011; and, up to £9,000 per year in 2012. Even given the introduction of fees, the
diversification of the law graduate population continued as students continued to be drawn to
vocationally orientated degree subjects. See UNIVERSITIES UK, PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN UK
HIGHER EDUCATION 10–14 (2012).
80. See BILL COLE, LAW SOC’Y, TRENDS IN THE SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION: ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2000, at 65–67 (2000).
81. Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) is the phraseology used in the United
Kingdom in place of the U.S. phraseology of “minorities.”
82. See COLE, supra note 80, at 65–67. In 1999, 15.8 percent of traineeships went to
BAME law graduates and 56.9 percent went to female law graduates. Id. at 66. Forty-eight
percent of them were registered in London with more than half registered in the square mile
of the City of London pointing to commercial expansion at the time. Id. at 66–67.
83. The LL.B. is a three-year undergraduate law degree, similar to the J.D. qualification.
All LL.B. degree programs must be approved by the Joint Academic Stages Board, which
has a similar function to American Bar Association accreditation. LL.B. degrees are classed
as qualifying law degrees, meaning that once a student has successfully attained an LL.B.
(Hons) degree she or he may continue on to the one-year vocational qualification required to
train to be a solicitor (the Legal Practice Course) or a barrister (Bar Professional Training
Course). After that a would-be solicitor would need to secure a two-year training contract in
a law firm or equivalent and undertake some final examinations, and a would-be barrister
would need to secure two six-month pupillages. Training contracts and pupillages are forms
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of the graduating population,84 and the U.K. BAME population is recorded
as 14 percent (it has increased from 6 percent in 1991 to 9 percent in
2001).85 Yet the diversity of the professions has not kept pace. The point
of attrition is evident at the compulsory work-based training stage, when the
BAME population drops from over 30 percent at the vocational stage of
education, to 13 percent (pupil barristers) and 22 percent (trainee solicitors),
demonstrating the persistence of raced and classed hiring practices. Those
from less traditionally privileged professional backgrounds remain at a
great disadvantage in securing professionally legitimated training that
affords the opportunity to become admitted legal professionals (as solicitors
and barristers).86 BAME lawyers have greater difficulty in accessing
vocational in-practice training, and when they do, they are concentrated
within the less prestigious parts of the professions and have greater attrition
rates from the legal profession relative to their white counterparts.87 They
are proportionately more likely to be in solo practice than are white
solicitors; this may be due, in part, to the greater difficulties they face with
gaining entry into, and progression within, the more lucrative and
established parts of the profession.88 Additional promotion barriers
confront the essentialist category of women; they are admitted in proportion
to their graduating numbers but still struggle to progress at the same rate as
men.89 There is some evidence that the Bar is drawing its pupils from an
increasingly privileged class background; the solicitor’s profession is not

of heavily supervised paid practice that operate similar to apprenticeships. Post completion
of a training contract or the pupillages, the solicitor or barrister is fully qualified but is still
required to work within a supervised context for an additional three years before they have
full practice rights or the opportunity to practice solo. Consequently, in most instances it is
compulsory to gain one of a limited number of training contracts or pupillages to be able to
practice law as an admitted legal professional (to undertake reserved activities) unless one
takes the CILEx route to qualification to become a chartered legal executive.
84. It is considered that approximately 10 percent of law graduates on qualifying law
degrees are overseas students, some of which will self-define as BAME although it is
unclear the extent to which this affects the figures presented above. Further, not all
LPC/BPTC and training contract/pupillage applicants will have undertaken an undergraduate
LL.B. degree. Approximately 5000 students a year undertake the Graduate Diploma in Law
course, which is an intensive graduate program that one may take following successful
completion of a non-law undergraduate degree. See Lisa Webley, What Empirical Legal
Studies Tell Us About the Legal Profession, Professorial Inaugural Lecture (Mar. 20, 2013),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixai0rliaRw.
85. See OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ENGLAND
AND WALES 2011, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-ethnicity.html.
86. See SOMMERLAD ET AL., supra note 3, at 58–60; Webley et al., supra note 6.
87. See SOLICITORS REGULATORY AUTH., INDEPENDENT REVIEW INTO DISPROPORTIONATE
REGULATORY OUTCOMES FOR BLACK AND MINORITY ETHNIC SOLICITORS 7 (2008), available
at http://www.sra.org.uk/ouseley/; see also LAW SOC’Y, ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS—
UNDERSTANDING THE BARRIERS 4 (2010).
88. See Lisa Webley, United Kingdom: What Robinson v. Solicitors Regulation
Authority Tells Us About the Contested Terrain of Race and Disciplinary Processes, 16
LEGAL ETHICS 236, 241 (2013).
89. For a discussion, see Webley & Duff, supra note 7.
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immune from this charge, either, as a recent study concluded.90 A
pronounced link between class and race in British society91 exacerbates the
barriers BAME law graduates face.92 Traditional law firm and chambers
hiring practices focus on cultural capital held in greater measure by social
elites believing them to be intellectual elites too; this results in unequal
opportunities93 and unequal access to a career in the legal profession.94
Although the Law Society and Bar Council have noted these concerns, they
have been more inclined to encourage measures that aim to raise the
aspirations of BAME school pupils to attend elite law schools rather than to
challenge the prevailing view that elite schooling necessarily indicates
lawyer excellence.95
Is the supply-side market free to choose who it accepts within it and in
what role? The figures above would suggest that it is, as it is still largely
admitted legal professionals who choose whom to hire as trainees and
pupils and, consequently, who joins them in the legitimated, higher status
end of the legal services market. Those that cannot gain entry are free to
work as paralegals, or to join the non-reserved sector. But they do not
enjoy the same status, they are not subject to the same disciplinary
provisions, and they are not within the jurisdiction of the LeO. Does this
serve the demand side well? The LSB has been given a statutory obligation
to encourage an independent, strong, diverse, and effective legal profession,

90. In 2010–2011, more than one-third (34.5 percent) of pupillages were awarded to
elite educated “Oxbridge” (Oxford or Cambridge) graduates, and this figure appears to be
increasing (23.7 percent were Oxbridge-educated in the previous year), although publicly
available data makes it difficult to confirm this. See BAR STANDARDS BD., BAR BAROMETER
TRENDS IN THE PROFILE OF THE BAR 49 (2011); BAR STANDARDS BD., BAR BAROMETER
TRENDS IN THE PROFILE OF THE BAR 49 (2012); see also OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra
note 85, at 4. Although it is argued that an elite education brings with it elite abilities, there
is little evidence to suggest this is actually true, and there is strong evidence that class
background plays an important role in gaining the grades required to enter elite institutions.
See Webley et al., supra note 6.
91. See ETHNICITY, SOCIAL MOBILITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY: COMPARING THE USA AND
UK 3–5 (Glenn C. Loury et al. eds., 2005); Louise Archer, Constructing Minority Ethnic
Middle Class Identity: An Exploratory Study with Parents, Pupils and Young Professionals,
4 SOC. 134, 144 (2011).
92. See, e.g., BEVERLY SKEGGS, FORMATIONS OF CLASS & GENDER: BECOMING
RESPECTABLE 94–95 (1997); John H. Goldthorpe, Rent, Class Conflict, and Class Structure:
A Commentary on Sørensen, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1572, 1573 (2000).
93. See Max Weber, Economic and Social History, in MAX WEBER SELECTIONS IN
TRANSLATION 285 (W.G. Runciman ed., E. Matthews trans., 1978); see also Richard Breen,
Foundations of a Neo-Weberian Class Analysis, in APPROACHES TO CLASS ANALYSIS 31–50
(Erik Olin Wright ed., 2005).
94. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 371 (George Simpson
trans., 1964); ALAN MILBURN, UNLEASHING ASPIRATION: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PANEL
ON FAIR ACCESS TO THE PROFESSIONS (2009); ALAN MILBURN, FAIR ACCESS TO
PROFESSIONAL CAREERS: A PROGRESS REPORT BY THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER ON SOCIAL
MOBILITY AND CHILD POVERTY 2 (May 2012).
95. For more information on the Law Society’s emphasis on the PRIME scheme, see
LAW
SOC’Y,
PRIME
AND
SOCIAL
MOBILITY
(2013),
available
at
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/articles/prime-and-social-mobility/. Many
of the law firms that participate in the scheme recruit trainee solicitors from a narrow elite
band of U.K. law schools.
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and to support the constitutional principle of the rule of law as indicated
above. To this end the LSB requires all legal entities to collect and report a
wide range of diversity data to allow judgments to be made. It also has the
power to intervene in the market if the professions do not deliver a diverse
legal profession, but it is unclear what would constitute sufficient
diversity.96 The LSB has supported the extension of more reserved
activities to CILEx, the chartered legal executive branch of the profession
that has greater heterogeneity of routes to full admission and a much better
record on diversity. The CILEx route to professional qualification holds
out the promise of professional admission as long as law graduates97 work
in a legal environment undertaking legal work under the supervision of an
admitted professional (an apprenticeship model undergirded with degreelevel examinations and continuing professional education requirements). A
once blocked section of the law graduate population may now have an
access route into the profession, even if being a professional may not be
once what it was. But this model currently lacks status in the market. The
market thrives on division of labor and stratification and, so, the question is
not whether there is stratification, but whether that stratification serves the
market well. While Milton Friedman contends that the market will pay
each individual what she or he is worth, Keynesians caution against this
indicating that power imbalances are inherent in any market. The Third
Way regulatory principles built into the LSA 2007 provide a mechanism to
counterbalance these power relations, but they would have to be recognized
as such to trigger a regulatory response.
The business case for diversity is part of the market’s mercurial
reinvention of itself. As Margaret Thornton indicates, “The movement
away from the dissonant language of in-equality in favour of diversity
serves to depoliticise further a competitive market environment in which
inequality is necessarily normative.”98 Legal professionals acting as
gatekeepers to training contracts and pupillages continue to be heavily
influenced by proxies for excellence that bolster their own status within the
field.99 The market metanarrative that each individual gets what she or he
96. David Edmonds, Training the Lawyers of the Future—A Regulator’s View, 45 L.
TCHR. 4, 13–14 (2010).
97. It is not necessary to be a law graduate: CILEx offers a range of tiered membership
levels and has examinations that mirror much of the law degree curriculum that allow nongraduates to work toward full professional qualification as a Fellow of CILEx too. See The
Cilex
Route,
CILEX,
http://www.cilexlawschool.ac.uk/prospective_students/qualify_as_solicitor/the_CILEx_rout
e (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
98. Thornton, supra note 40, at 12; see also Wendy Bottero & Sarah Irwin, Locating
Difference; Class, “Race” and Gender, and the Shaping of Social Inequalities, 51 SOC. REV.
463, 479–80 (2003).
99. For a discussion of the proxies used, see generally Louise Ashley & Laura Empson,
Differentiation and Discrimination: Understanding Social Class and Social Exclusion in
Leading Law Firms, 66 HUM. REL. 219 (2013); Louise Ashley, Making A Difference? The
Use (and Abuse) of Diversity Management at the UK’s Elite Law Firms, 24 WORK, EMP. &
SOC’Y 711, 717–19 (2010); Andy Cook et al., London’s Legal Elite: Recruitment Through
Cultural Capital and the Reproduction of Social Exclusivity in City Professional Service
Fields, 44 ENV’T & PLAN. 1744, 1750–58 (2012); Webley et al., supra note 6.
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deserves is so instantiated that there is little critical reflection on the proxies
that are used, on personal complicity in the division of labor and status, and
on the iron grip of the market.100 Even were the state to return to the
politics of social justice, would much of the commercially orientated
profession be prepared to reflect on its use of (some) law graduates as
human resources to extract surplus value to fuel their profit streams? The
“over supply” of law graduates is useful cover for a project that seeks to
innovate in its delivery of services, increase productivity through greater
work intensification, and reduce the number of highly paid staff.101 Where
possible it will reduce exposure to low profit work and focus on global
markets where greater profits are available—it will hire lawyers who appeal
to the elites that they serve. But can the market also deliver for everyday
consumers, at a price they can afford and at a quality that protects their
interests?
CONCLUSIONS: REGULATION, EQUALITY, DIVERSITY,
AND INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL MARKET
The LSA 2007 produces a series of interesting paradoxes: marketization;
greater understanding of reserved and unreserved activities by those outside
the profession; the potential to increase access to a legal career for
marginalized groups; and the potential for greater access to legal redress at
the right price for consumers. A lack of professional body engagement with
structural inequality in admission to the profession, and also to an extent in
terms of access to justice, has begun to erode its monopoly status as the
gatekeeper for all legal professionals. Supermarkets such as the Cooperative are introducing high street law practice to the public and are
hiring lawyers of all levels of qualification, admission status, and
socioeconomic and university background (including non-graduates), to
provide those services. Professional bodies have understandably begun a
call to arms to reduce the influx of “unqualified” legal advisers into the
market, in part by placing ethics, training, and regulation onto the agenda.
Yet, it is in part the established professions’ failure to engage with these
issues at an earlier point, the persistent “structured inequality” within the
profession, coupled with a lack of a clarion public service ethos, which
allowed the state to introduce legislation that removed most of the last
vestiges of professional autonomy from once strong organizations. But old
status hierarchies persist in some sections of the market as the aura of the
old professions and the old hierarchies within them give a prestige that can
be leveraged. They will continue to operate gatekeeper-closure measures so
as to filter potential members of their professions for as long as they yield
value. Over time, CILEx may yet challenge this in high street and everyday

100. See Stephen Ackroyd & Daniel Muzio, The Reconstructed Professional Firm:
Explaining Change in English Legal Practices, 28 ORG. STUD. 729, 739–41 (2007); Hilary
Sommerlad, The Commercialisation of Law and the Enterprising Legal Practitioner:
Continuity and Change, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 73, 76–77 (2011).
101. See Clarke, supra note 10, at 54–55.
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legal contexts, but it is unlikely to dent the corporate sphere to any great
degree.
Neoliberalism has diversified the range of options that clients and wouldbe lawyers have open to them, but individuals are required to make choices
and to take responsibility for those choices. Low-income and first-time
consumers will struggle without adequate signposting of differences
between the regulated and unregulated sector, even if they can find services
at a price they can afford. The limited nature of the LeO jurisdiction creates
a distortion that means that the market is neither truly free, nor truly
regulated, for the benefit of consumers.
And would-be admitted
professionals can do little to overcome the market distortions of the training
contract and pupillage control mechanism unless and until the market
provides them with a power base from which to seek change. The ideology
of neoliberalism has won through, but the bureaucratic responses have yet
to allow the market to function as an inclusive market. The question
Stephanie Lee Mudge poses is not the historic “how much state,” but the
contemporary “how much market” do we need?102 How much regulatory
intervention is required so as to allow all would-be legal professionals to be
judged on the basis of their competence and productivity, rather than their
background and status? And how much regulatory intervention is required
so as to allow all consumers to be full actors in the market to choose
services on the basis of quality and costs to secure their legal rights and
access justice?

102. See Mudge, supra note 24, at 724.

